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General Review 
The World Economy 
There are now unmistakable signs of a sustained recovery in world trade 
and production. Both the imports and the exports of the leading 
industrialised countries in February were substantially above their 
level of twelve months previously. It may reasonably be expected 
that world trade as a whole will expand by about 7% in real terms this year 
Different countries are emerging from the recession at different rates: 
amongst the first to emerge clearly from the recession has been the 
United States. 
After the uncertainties and false starts which marked its recovery in 
1975, the United States economy so far in 1976 has been showing 
encouraging signs of a steady revival. The stimulus appears to be 
coming largely from an increase in consumer expenditure, and this is 
reflected in new housing starts, new car sales, in rising industrial 
production, personal incomes, and in the index of leading indicators. 
A comparison of such indicators with their performance in the past 
suggests that the pace of recovery from the present recession in the 
United States is slower than on previous occasions since the end of 
World War 2.: it is certainly slow enough to have left a considerable 
gap in the level of capacity utilisation in manufacturing. Although 
it has stopped rising, the level of unemployment remains high by 
historical standards. It is clear that the American authorities prefer 
a policy of cautious expansion to the risk of higher inflation through 
a faster expansion of monetary demand. This policy of cautious 
expansion may seem to be justified by the further moderation of the rate 
of consumer price inflation in January, while wholesale prices fell in 
both January and February. 
If the United States continues to hold to its policy of moderate monetary 
growth, and if this policy is followed by other leading industrialised 
countries such as West Germany, we must expect to see a further 
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depreciation of the sterling exchange rate with respect to the dollar and 
the Deutsche Mark. Of course, in an election year there is always the 
possibility that the US government might be tempted to move monetary and 
fiscal policy in a more expansionary direction with a view to significantly 
reducing the high level of unemployment. If this possibility were pursued, 
then of course the chances are that the response to the stimulation of 
aggregate demand would come in the form of an increase in the rate of 
inflation as well as, or even in place of, an increase in the volume of 
output. 
The pattern of recovery in West Germany is broadly similar to that in the 
United States. Real GNP increased by 3 per centage points in the last 
quarter of 1975, while unemployment has levelled off and there are signs 
of a continuing decline in the rate of inflation. As in the United States, 
recovery has been backed by an increase in private consumption, but in 
Germany there are signs that both exports and export orders are increasing. 
At the beginning of the year the government was forecasting a growth in 
real GNP of 4.5% during 1976, but the report on the economy prepared by 
the joint working party of the five main economic research institutes 
forecasts growth of 5.5% this year. The upward revision of the forecast 
reflects the continuing flow of encouraging economic statistics which 
have appeared in the German economy in the first quarter of this year. 
The rate of inflation is expected to fall to 4.5% from 6.0% in 1975, while 
the level of unemployment in West Germany has now fallen below the UK rate. 
The timing and speed of the upturn is less clear in Japan than in the 
United States or West Germany. Consumer spending appears still to be 
inhibited by lingering uncertainties concerning inflation and employment, 
and the level of personal savings remains at over 25%. While some industries 
are doing well again, others are still working a long way below capacity. 
With rising government expenditure and exports, it is only a matter of time 
before consumer spending adds to the impetus of recovery. The official 
forecast is for a rate of growth of real GNP of 5.6% in 1976. 
With substantial recoveries expected this year in the other European 
countries, except the UK and Italy, and with the oil producing countries 
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continuing to maintain a high level of imports, the general impression is 
of a slow but steady expansion of major world markets throughout the rest 
of 1976. 
The United Kingdom 
The fall in total output which began in the fourth quarter of 1974 appears 
to have ended. Each of the three measures of GDP increased in the 
fourth quarter of 1975, the output measure by a little over \%. During 
1975 real living standards fell by around 4%, despite an increased share 
of wages and salaries in total money income during the year. 
The rate of increase in prices has continued to slow down, but it is still 
twice as fast as in the UK's principal trading partners. It now seems 
unlikely that the government's target of a 10% increase over the previous 
twelve months will have been reached by the last quarter of this year. 
Unemployment has continued to rise, although more slowly of late, until 
the seasonally adjusted monthly figure for March showed a fall. This 
particular statistic points to two distinct views about the timing of 
the upswing from the present recession. 
The orthodox view, of which the principal exponents are the National 
Institute and the Bank of England, is that only a modest recovery in 
output can be expected in 1976. On this view, unemployment may be 
expected to continue rising, if more slowly, until perhaps the end of the 
year or even the first quarter of 1977. But there may be a substantial 
decline in the rate of inflation by the end of the year. 
An alternative view put forward by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group in 
their review of 29 March suggests that "output will rise fast as destocking 
ends and world trade recovers". Unemployment will level off and even 
fall for a while, but price inflation will not fall below 13% by the end 
of 1976. Support for the Cambridge view is to be found in the unfilled 
vacancies figures, which many hold to be a more reliable guide to the 
labour market than unemployment, and which have been rising for three 
months in succession. Cambridge pessimism about inflation may also be 
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supported by the rate of increase in the money supply. 
The indicators which are available at the time of writing, (14 April), 
do not offer a clear view as to the timing and strength of any recovery 
in the UK economy. Certainly, the index of longer leading indicators 
published in Economic Trends shows a continuing rise, and this positive 
indicator is supported by the results reported in the monthly survey of 
business opinion conducted by the Financial Times. On the other hand, 
manufacturing output in February fell below the January level, while the 
latest figures on retail sales and new car registrations show no sign of 
a revival in consumer expenditure. 
Since the second half of 1975 rising public consumption and a slower rate 
of destocking have provided the main stimulus to aggregate demand. The 
government has declared its intention of restraining the growth in 
public consumption. If this intention could be realised, and private 
consumption similarly held down, then resources may be available for 
increased exports and most importantly for increased investment. With 
the devaluation of the pound,and the steady expansion of overseas markets 
as the year moves on, the demand for UK exports seems assured. It is 
much less certain that a similar demand for capital goods will be 
forthcoming in the near future. The available evidence on recent 
investment behaviour and declared investment intentions suggests that the 
fall in manufacturing investment which marked the year 1975 may continue 
through 1976. The gap in aggregate demand could certainly be filled by 
expanded private consumption, but this would only be at the cost of 
future employment and living standards. 
One of the remarkable features of the inflation of the past two years has 
been the way in which it has eroded profits. After deducting stock 
appreciation, the share of company trading profits in UK domestic income 
in 1975 was just oyer 6%, about \% below the share in 1974, and well 
below the ten year average of 12%. In the United States, the corporate 
profit margins in 1975 were the lowest for thirty years. In the last 
issue of the Commentary we referred to the dual role of profits as both 
an incentive to and a means of investment. We think that this theme is 
sufficiently important to justify returning to it briefly in this issue. 
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It.should first of all be made clear that the role of profits as a means 
to investment does not refer to its role as a source of liquidity. 
Liquidity can be increased at any time by an act of government, but only 
profits can create the potential supply of real resources (capital goods) 
which is required for investment. Of course, capital goods can be 
imported but this imposes a future burden on the economy. 
In the course of the next two months, there will be an intensive debate 
about economic policy in the United Kingdom. During this period of 
negotiation between the government and the TUC, discussion will centre 
on the government's proposal for income tax reliefs conditional upon 
acceptance of a 3% limit to money wage increases. But the debate will 
inevitably be widened, and various other devices will be advanced, singly 
and in packages, for the management of the economy. Such devices will 
include other wages policies, monetary and fiscal arrangements, import 
controls and devaluation. 
The fact that we wish to emphasise is that all these devices, including 
that advanced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, are purely short-run: 
none of them, either singly or in combination, can make future employment 
and output levels higher in the longer-run than they otherwise would have 
been. The necessary condition for achieving the latter objective is to 
raise substantially the rate of investment. As we said before, future 
employment at non-decreasing real wages can only be expanded by increasing 
the present level of profits. If at the same time the circumstances of 
the economy require a larger share of output going to exports, and a 
significant increase in the numbers of people to be offered employment, 
then it seems unlikely that all of these objectives can be realised 
simultaneously without lowering the present level of real wages. Such 
a painful course of action might be avoided by continuing to borrow abroad 
and/or reducing public consumption. But each of these courses has also 
a real cost. 
In the long run the only solution to the problems of the British economy 
lies in raising productivity more rapidly, which implies in turn a 
willingness to accept technical progress, occupational mobility, higher 
profit rates, and an appropriate structure of incentives. We would 
- 8 -
suggest that i t may be as important for the government to direct i t s 
economic policy to these objectives as towards short-run demand management. 
In par t icu lar , we repeat our bel ief that government policy should be so 
directed that re- t ra in ing rather than unemployment should be the accepted 
normal consequence of the loss of a job. 
I t may be objected that acceptance of technical progress, higher p ro f i t 
rates, and an appropriate structure of incentives are p o l i t i c a l l y un-
acceptable to a substantial part of the population, presumably because 
they do not l i ke the private ownership of property, thus of p ro f i t s . 
I f these att i tudes pers is t , then i t is certainly possible to change the 
forms of ownership of productive organisations from private to social . 
And of course many forms of social ownership are avai lable, ranging from 
producers co-operatives to state-owned monopolies. Any such changes are 
a matter for the po l i t i ca l process. What economists should point out 
is that such a possible change in i ns t i t u t i ons , transforming "cap i ta l i s t 
p r o f i t " into "soc ia l i s t surplus", does not permit any escape from the 
necessity of observing the foregoing rules for increasing output and 
employment. These rules are as true for the UK economy to-day as they 
are for any other real world economy, whether cap i ta l i s t or soc ia l i s t , 
whether past, present or future. 
